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LIABILITY OF A LANDLORD TO THIRD PERSONS FOR INJURIES OCCURRING OUTSIDE THE RENTED PROPERTY
It is not unusual that courts are faced with the question of the
extent of the liability of a landlord to third persons for injuries
received outside the rented property and caused by a nuisance or
dangerous condition existing on the rented property It has been
uniformly said that as the tenant is in possession and has an opportunity to correct the defect before injury that prima facie the
tenant and not the landlord is liable.1 However, there are certain
situations in which the landlord is also liable. Should such a situation exist, the burden should be on the injured party to show the
existence of such an exception and its applicability to Ins injury before the landlord will be responsible. Even here the tenant is not
absolved of liability but remains liable with the landlord as a joint
tortfeasor'
The term "nuisance" as used herein includes not only a continual interference with the enjoyment of one's land or of a public
right, but also instantaneous interferences-such as the collapse of
a wall. While, for technical accuracy this latter is not a nuisance, it
has been so uniformly considered by the courts as a nuisance and is
so governed by the same rules that it is more practical to consider
it as such. Thus, for our purpose here it will suffice to define a
nuisance as including anything that endangers life or health or gives
offense to the senses or which violates the laws of decency or obstructs reasonable and comfortable use of realty or public ways arising from the wrongful use of land.'
It has been thought advisable to divide this discussion into the
following three general categories:
1) When, at the time the lease was executed there existed on
the premises a condition amounting to a nuisance;
2) When, at the time possession was taken under the lease
there existed on the premises no nuisance either active or quiescent
but later during the term a nuisance came into being thereon:
3) When, at the time the lease was executed there existed on
the property a potential nuisance which in the normal course of
events developed into a nuisance.
If at the time the lease is executed a nuisance exists on the
premises and the lessor knows or should know of its existence, he is
said to be liable for any injury caused thereby. However, if at the
time he was not and could not by the exercise of reasonable dili'Knight v. Foster, 163 N.C. 329, 79 S.E. 614 (1913), Ahern v
Steele, 115 N.Y. 203, 22 N.E. 193 (1889)
Gordon v Peltzer, 56 Mo. App. 599 (1893), Brogan v. Hanan,
55 App. Div 92, 66 N.Y.S. 1066 (2d Dept. 1900) reversed on other
grounds, 93 App. Div 580, 87 N.Y.S. 930 (2d Dept. 1904).
'Hall v Putney, 291 Ill. App. 508, 10 N.E. 2d 204, 207 (1937).
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gence have been aware of the existence of the nuisance, the courts
with few exceptions hold the landlord blameless.' Normally, the
courts reach this first result by inferring from the landlord's act of
leasing the property with an existing nuisance, an authorization to
the tenant to continue the wrong.' Should the court find this inference is rebutted by a condition in the lease that the tenant shall
remedy the defect, it may as some have done, find that every landlord has a duty to abate every nuisance of which he is aware and
over which he has control, and his failure to do so is an actionable
tort from which anyone injured by the continuing nuisance may
recover. Still other courts faced with such a covenant in the lease
have said that the fact that the tenant has covenanted to repair will
not shield the landlord from liability for an obligor may not transfer his liability to another without the consent of the obligee.1
It is normally said that if at the time possession was taken
under the lease there existed on the premises no nuisance either
active or quiescent, the landlord is not liable for a condition that
later develops,' since a lease is considered as a conveyance of land
for a term and during that term the landlord usually has no right
to enter and abate the nuisance. However, since the lease is created
by contract, the effect and operation of the lease may be altered by
covenants therein. Thus, it would be well to consider the effect of a
covenant in the lease requiring the tenant to perform a particular
act on the premises during the term, or of a covenant requiring the
landlord to repair.
The relation of master and servant is not to be implied in a
lease and usually the doctrine of respondeat superzor has no appli'Swift & Co. v Peoples Coal & Oil Co., 121 Conn. 579, 186 Atl.
629 (1936) Wiffin v De Tweede Northwestern & Pacific Hypotheek
Bank, 52 Idaho 165, 12 P 2d 271 (1932) East End Improvement Co.
v. Sipp, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 924 (1893) Benton v. Kerman, 127 N.J.
Eq. 434, 13 A. 2d 825 (1940) Junkermann v Tilyou Realty Co., 213
N.Y. 404, 108 N.E. 190 (1915) Timlin v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 126
N.Y. 514, 27 N.E. 786, 22 Am. St. Rep. 845 (1891) --City of Los Angelo
v. Sitas, 143 Tex. 154, 183 S.W 2d 417 (1944), with at least one
court requiring notice and request to abate before liability would
arise if a nuisance existed on the land at time of purchase and was
at that time subject to an existing lease which was renewed by the
purchaser, Webber v Wright, 124 Me. 190, 126 Atl. 737 (1924)
'Decker v Pacific Coast Steam Ship Co., 3 Alaska 230 (1906)
Fleischner v Citizens Real Estate & Investment Co., 25 Ore. 119, 35
31 N.E. 757,
Pac. 174 (1893) see Lufkin v Zane, 159 Mass. 117, 758, 34 Am. St. Rep. 262, - (1892) Britton v Donwin Realty Corp.,
123 N.J.L. 540, 10 A. 2d 262, 263 (1940).
'See Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States v. McClellan,
286 Ky 17, 22, 149 S.W 2d 730, 733 (1941).
'Baily v Dunaway, 8 Ga. App. 713, 70 S.E. 141 (1911) Kelly
v. Laclede Real Estate & Investment Co., 155 S.W 2d 90 (Mo. 1941)
Junkermann v Tilyou Realty Co., 213 N.Y. 404, 108 N.E. 190 (1915)
see Miller v
6 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT Sec. 101 (1910)
Fisher, 111 Md. 91, 73 Atl. 891, 892 (1909)
L.J. -S
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cation to the acts of the tenant.' However, this does not prevent the
parties from expressly providing in the lease that the tenant shall be
the servant of the landlord, as where the tenant agrees to construct
certain buildings during the term. In such a situation it has been
held that under the usual rules of agency the landlord is liable for
any resulting injury not only if the act would necessarily result in
a nuisance, but if it does so result due to the misfeasance or nonfeasance of the tenant if done within the scope of the employment
as set forth in the lease."
Frequently, a lease provides that during the term the landlord
will maintain the premises in repair. Under this state of facts, the
lessor becomes liable if a third person suffers from a nuisance
caused thereon by the disrepair of the premises." Most courts have
predicated liability on the reasoning that the lessor has contracted to
repair, and as the tenant would be liable to any third person injured by the failure to repair, he would then have an action over
against the lessor for damages he was forced to pay. Then, to
avoid circuity of action, they have allowed an action by the injured
person against the landlord in the first instance.' Some courts have
recognized the fallacy of such a theory both from the standpoint of
the normal measures of contract damages and from a procedural
point of view and have developed a more substantial ground of
liability These courts have said that the usual duty of a landlord to
keep his land free from nuisances passes from him when he surrenders possession to his tenant. But where the landlord covenants
to repair, he reserves to himself a conditional possession and prevents this duty from passing from him in its entirety and thus re3
tains the same duty as though no lease .had been given.
Between these two situations, there lies a third field which is
one of greater uncertainty It is within the power of every landlord
at the time he executes the lease to control the subsequent use of the
premises by the tenant. Since the landlord by leasing is making a
use of his land, he Inust not authorize a use by the tenant which he
knows will encroach on the protected rights of others.' Thus, if one
leases a parcel of land with a quiescent or potential nuisance there'See Midland Oil Co. v Thigpen, 4 F 2d 85, 91 (C.C.A. 8th 1924)
writ of error dismissed in 273 U.S. 658, 71 L.Ed. 826, 47 Sup. Ct. 343
(1927)
" Byne v. Maycr, etc. of City of Americus, 6 Ga. App. 48, 64 S.E.
285 (1909)
11Lebensburger v Scofield, 155 Fed. 85 (C.C.A. 6th 1907) Appel v. Muller, 262 N.Y. 278, 186 N.E. 785 (1933), see Klepper v Sey158 N.E. 29, 32
mour House Corp. of Ogdensburg, 246 N.Y. 85, (1927)
"Lebensburger v Scofield, 155 Fed. 85 (C.C.A. 6th 1907) City
of Lowell v Spaulding, 4 Cush. 277, 50 Am. Dec. 775, (Mass. 1849).
186 N.E. 785, 786 (1933),
"See Appel v Muller, 262 N.Y. 278, Burdick v Cheadle, 26 Ohio St. 393, 396, 20 Am. Rep. 767, - (1875)
"Fish v. Dodge, 4 Denio 311, 47 Am. Dec. 254 (N.Y. 1847).
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on, he has enabled the lessee to injure others, and may be held
liable, not for maintaining a nuisance, but for participating in the
creation of one if injury results in the normal course of events."
The ordinary effects of nature acting without the interference of a
human agency may properly be considered as the normal course of
events. Should a landlord dig an excavation on his land so that it
catches and holds surface water, and after the transfer of possession,
it percolates through the ground to the injury of his neighbor, he
would be liable for that injury;" or if the potential nuisance which
later comes to life without human intervention be a deteriorated
condition at the time possession is surrendered, he is likewise held
at fault." However, even though a defective condition existed at the
time of leasing, the landlord is not always liable. The question of his
liability has been said to rest on a distinction between defects
remediable by repair and those requiring rebuilding. It is only in
this latter situation that liability attaches to the landlord.'
The phrase, "normal course of events," is not restricted to acts
of nature but extends to acts of the tenant consistent with.the use
intended by the parties at the time the lease was executed. If, at that
time, the parties contemplated a use which acted on a quiescent
nuisance and caused it to injure a third person, the lessor is liable
for the damage done." Nor can he escape liability by saying that no
injury would have been done had the premises not been so used if
he impliedly authorized such a use by leasing when he knew it
would be so used." However, once again, the courts have been loath
to place liability where there is no fault. They have said, that in
order for the lessor to be liable, the tenant must have pursued the
'
safest course." Hence, if the premises could be used in the contemplated manner without becoming a nuisance, the lessor is not
liable for the act or neglect of the tenant which creates the nui" Simmons v. Kennedy, 74 Fla. 411, 76 So. 739 (1918) Peacock
Distilling Co. v Commonwealth, 25 Ky Law Rep. 1778, 78 S.W 893
Knauss v Brua,
(1904), Fow v Roberts, 108 Pa. St. 489 (1885)
107 Pa. St. 85 (1884), Larson v. Calder's Park Co., 54 Utah 325, 180
Pac. 599 (1919).
"Canon City & C.C.R.R. Co. v. Oxtoby, 45 Colo. 214, 100 Pac.
1127 (1908).
'-Updegraff v City of Ottumwa, 210 Iowa 382, 226 N.W 928
(1929).
"'See Knauss v Brua, 107 Pa. St. 85 (1884)
"Peacock Distilling Co. v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky L. Rep. 1778,
78 S.W 893 (1904), Miller v. Fisher, 111 Md. 91, 73 Atl. 891 (1909)
Xackman v. Arlington Mill, 137 Mass. 277 (1884), Fow v Roberts,
108 Pa. St. 489 (1885) Knauss v Brua. 107 Pa. St. 85 (1884) Larson
v. Calder's Park Co., 54 Utah 325, 180 Pac. 599 (1919).
"Peacock Distilling Co. v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky L. Rep. 1778,
78 S.W 893 (1904) Fow v Roberts, 108 Pa. St. 489 (1885) Knauss
v. Brua, 107 Pa. St. 85 (1884).
" Meloy v. City of Santa Monica, 124 Cal. App. 622, 12 P 2d 1072
(1932), Kennedy v. Garrard, 156 S.W 570 (Tex. 1913).
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sance. But if it is not to be avoided by the tenant's exercise of due
care, the lessor is liable for the injury so caused.'
In conclusion it may be said that the landlord is liable m the
following situations for a nuisance existing on his rented property,
subject of course to the exceptions to be mentioned. If at the time of
the demise there exists on the premises a nuisance of which the
landlord knows or should have known he is liable for any injury
caused thereby to persons off the rented property regardless of any
covenants in the lease requiring the tenant to remedy the defects.
Although it may be said as a general rule that if at the time possession is surrendered to the tenant the property did not constitute a
nuisance the landlord is not liable for damages caused by a nuisance
subsequently created on the premises. There are two exceptions in
which even here he is liable, that is where the lease constitutes the
tenant the agent of the landlord to make alterations on the premises
and he creates a nuisance thereon, or when the landlord provides in
the lease that he will repair. Then, finally the landlord may be
liable for a nuisance subsequently created on the premises if the
contemplated acts of the tenant caused a quiescent nuisance, which
existed at the time possession was transferred, to come into existence and injure a third person off the premises.
W THRELKELD

- Meloy v City of Santa Monica, 124 Cal. App. 622, 12 P 2d
1072 (1932) Lufkin v Zane, 157 Mass. 117, 31 N.E. 757, 34 Am. St.
R~ep. 262 (1892)
2Wasilewski v McGuire Art Shop, 117 N.J.L. 264, 187 At. 530
(1936)

